Kakakelvin Posted April 16, 2010 Report Posted April 16, 2010 Yo Wasup all, I'm taking a poli-sci course as an elective... and considering I'm a finance and economics specialist I really have no idea what I'm talking about Lmao... Anyway, I thought I'd post it here so that, on the outside chance that someone is actually interested/bored enough to read the thing, that I might get some feedback. Thing is, a part of it is on "Asian Values" and while I am Asian, I grew up in Canada and am very much not "Asian" in a cultural sense, so sometimes I feel as if I'm talking without authority. Anyway here it is: Economic Growth – The Infallible Source of Legitimacy for Authoritarian Regimes in Southeast Asia Introduction Economic growth and development has often been used as rational for the existence authoritarian regimes. This paper will analyse the links between economic growth and the persistence of authoritarian regimes. According to traditional modernization theory, economic growth will lead to the creation of a number of conflicting forces in the context of democratization. In particular, growth leads to the rise of the middle class, the formation of an intelligentsia and a general want and ability to be involved in politics; all of which are commonly sited as conditions favourable for democratization. Conversely, economic growth also leads to performance legitimacy and reduced population grievances which are both conditions favourable for regime stability and continued authoritarian rule. The question then follows: under what conditions do the former conditions outweigh the latter? In an attempt to answer this question, this paper will take the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and from them seek to identify a set of specific conditions that lean an economically developing country towards authoritarianism vs. democracy. As will be developed, this paper puts forth a hypothesis that the aforementioned conditions can be found based on two broad categories – at least in the cases analysed. They are as follows: 1) Performance legitimacy derived from sustained economic growth. More specifically, it will be shown that countries subject to continued, stable and significant increases in economic well being will be more likely to sustain its present regime (authoritarian or otherwise). The intuition for this can be simplified with the old idiom: “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. From this, the complement reasoning must then also be true; countries undergoing wide fluctuations in economic growth are more likely to see regime change. 2) Cultural factors promoting or inhibiting the political roles of an economic middle class. While classic modernization theory is not flawed when it suggests that the increasing wealth of a society as a whole is likely to free time and create motivation for wider political participation, there are a number of factors that can undermine these incentives, especially within Southeast Asia. Central to these barriers are so-called “Asian values” regarding governance, as well as racial and religious societal groupings. By looking at trends and empirical evidence, this paper will evaluate each of the selected cases based on these factors and attempt to explain why the country remained authoritarian or not. It will not seek to make specific predictions about the future of a regime, but instead will seek to draw an explanatory picture of historical events. Case Background and Qualification The cases of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are being used because they share a unique set of similarities which allow one to highlight their differences. All three were former colonies of European powers and thus all began with a period of fragile democracy as instituted as a condition for independence. As such, all three of them were, at least at some point, procedural democracies. Furthermore, their close geographical proximity, coupled with their similar racial make-up (though the proportions vary, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia all have Malay, Indians and Chinese as their most visible groups) mean that all three nations are subject to most of the same macro-forces, economic or otherwise. All three nations experienced periods of substantial economic growth from the 1960’s to the 1990’s. Additionally, they were all subject to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, which will be central to this paper’s analysis. The result is a condition as close to cerebis parabis as can be observed in the region; this allows us to analyse their differences in regime change frequency in relative isolation. In these three cases we have a near perfect representation of the possibilities regarding the continuity of authoritarian regime: 1) In Singapore, we have the extreme case for continuity. The PAP has been in power since 1959 and has never lost more than a handful of seats. Furthermore, Lee Kuan Yew has retained significant power beyond his already long reign as Prime Minister. Furthermore, after a brief period under Goh Chok Tong, Lee’s son, Lee Hsien Loon is now the new Prime Minister of the most economically developed country in Southeast Asia, making the regime resemble a monarchy more than the democracy it claims to be. 2) In Indonesia, we have the extreme case for change. From democracy in the 1950’s, through Sukarno’s “guided democracy”, to Suharto’s regime from 1965 till the 1997 financial crisis, followed finally by the democracy that has persisted since then, Indonesia has had a very eventful political history. Many of these events, as this paper will show, can be attributed to economic factors. 3) In Malaysia, we have the case for the middle ground. The Barisan National, led by the United Malay’s National Organization has retained parliamentary power since 1957, but only in the face of significant change within the party as well as considerable challenge from a constantly evolving opposition. Race and economic wealth has been centre to this country’s gradual evolution. On Legitimacy Before one begins to analyse sources of legitimacy, it is first necessary to establish its importance; after all, the very term “authoritarian regime” suggests that such a government would operating outside the checks and balances imposed by a watchful public. Nevertheless, as Fukuyama writes, “all regimes capable of effective action must be based on some principle of legitimacy” . In The End of History, Fukuyama’s discussion on “The Weakness of Strong States” suggests that, even in the most totalitarian of regimes, government must rest upon popular support, at least at the level of political elites. He contests, somewhat controversially, that even Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin were ultimately supported by widespread legitimacy. He points out that “a tyrant can rule his children, old men or perhaps his wife by force, if he is physically stronger than they are, but he is not likely to be able to rule more than two or three people in this fashion and certainly not a nation of millions.” While the discussion of European fascism and communism may not seem relevant to authoritarian rule of Southeast Asia, it shows that legitimacy is important even in such extreme cases, not to mention the procedural democracies that this paper analyses. So what does this imply for the purposes of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore? Considering the centrality of widespread legitimacy to effective rule, we can make the assumption that if a regime stays in power for an extended period of time, then it must have held at least the minimum amount of legitimacy during that period. Conversely, we can also conclude that regime change can be caused by a loss of legitimacy. It should be noted, however, that this paper departs from Fukuyama’s notion that all non-democratic regimes must legitimize themselves by arguing that their nations were not ready for democracy. Though this certainly may be true during some parts of Indonesian history, continued authoritarian rule in Singapore shows that non-democratic regimes can maintain themselves even in advanced states of development. Performance Legitimacy – Real Economic Growth Central to the arguments put forth by this paper is the notion that economic growth leads to regime stability. This is difficult to asses in a positive manner, so instead evidence to support the claim that large fluctuations in economic growth cause changes in regime. By assessing the compliment argument, we can establish economic growth as a condition for regime stability. Does economic growth play a factor in regime shifts? The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a major economic event that caused significant damage to authoritarian regimes in Indonesia and less significantly in Malaysia. Singapore also experienced some political backlash but nevertheless maintained its stability to much greater degree. Given these results, our hypothesis would predict that Indonesia would have suffered most greatly from the recession, Malaysia the second most and Singapore the least. GDP growth rates for these three nations from 1997 through 2000 are shown . 1997 1998 1999 2000 Indonesia 4.7% -13.7% -4.0% 2.5% Malaysia 7.7% -6.8% 0.93% 2.0% Singapore 8.0% 1.5% 0.54% 4.2% We can see from these numbers are exactly what the hypothesis predicts. Although all three nations were affected by this event, Indonesia was significantly harder hit, and Singapore was relatively insulated. Malaysia, as expected, was on the middle ground for economic hardship during this time. As convincing as the above statistics may be, they are not sufficient to explain why some the Suharto regime toppled while the BN lost its 2/3rd majority and the PAP actually strengthened its parliamentary presence (pushing the opposition to a mere 2 seats). Certainly there were many other non-economic factors (some of which will be discussed later in this paper), but continuing on the topic of performance legitimacy caused by economic growth, let’s look at how these three nations had been performing from 1970 till 1996. Mean GDP Growth Rate Standard Deviation Best single-year growth Worst single-year contraction Indonesia 6.9% 2.4% 11.3% -0.33% Malaysia 7.3% 3.0% 11.7% -0.88% Singapore 8.5% 3.3% 13.7% -1.7% What these numbers are meant to show is the amount of “performance equity” the regimes were riding on going into the financial crisis. From this data, we can see that if we are to assume that Suharto’s regime in Indonesia carried the smallest amount of “performance equity” at the beginning of 1997 (since that was the regime that actually fell as a result of the crisis), then we can certainly see that mean GDP growth rate is extremely important for maintaining performance legitimacy. One may also point out that the standard deviations and worst-single years are larger for Singapore and Malaysia than for Indonesia. In fact, the statistics are the exact opposite as to what the model would predict; however, it can be argued that these fluctuations are still well within the range needed to raise legitimacy in the public eye. The reason for this is that, despite a larger standard deviation, the overall growth range is still high. To illustrate, consider a year that is one standard deviation below the mean for each country. Indonesia would have had a growth rate of 4.5%, Malaysia 4.3% and Singapore 5.2%. Singapore obviously still has the best growth rate. In fact, even at 2 standard deviations below the mean (2.1%, 1.3% and 1.9%), Malaysia and Singapore are not significantly worse off than Indonesia. An additional factor may also have been income distribution. Economic growth in Singapore was felt by the vast majority of the population, with several government projects aiming to improve the quality of life for lower income families (such as income supplementation and the public housing programs of the HDB). Malaysian politics were based around strong affirmative action in an attempt to bring economic power to the majority Malays (business enterprise had previously been dominated by the minority Chinese). Indonesia, on the other hand, had its economy based around natural resource extraction and led to a more polar distribution of income. Despite the considerations above, perhaps the biggest factor in regime stability was their ability to manage the 1997 financial crisis. GDP growth drops in Indonesia were significantly larger than in Singapore, with Malaysia playing the middle ground between 1997 and 1998. Asian Values – Cultural Factors Unfavourable to Western-style Democracy Mark R. Thompson wrote that the so-called “Asian values”, which had been used as justification for the continued existence of what he called “developmental dictatorships” that were largely successful from the 1970’s, was crushed in the wake of 1997-98 financial crisis. He describes these values as a “form of developmentalism, with the claim that, until prosperity is achieved, democracy remains an unaffordable luxury”. This kind of reasoning has the effect of either completely destroying or undeniably solidifying authoritarian rule in the face of economic crisis. The former case occurs when, as it did in Indonesia, the economic downturn is so severe that the people abandon these values. The public’s arguments can be simplified to: we are in an economic downturn for which the government is to blame. Therefore, these values are obviously wrong and we should shift away from authoritarianism (and towards democracy). This strongly favours regime change and democratization. The latter case occurs when, as it did in Singapore, the economic downturn is harsh but not catastrophic and the government is able to handle it swiftly and skilfully (or at least appear to do so). Public reasoning can be simplified to: we are in an economic downturn for which the government is not to blame. The only way to get out of this is to rally behind these values and our technocratic government. This strongly favours regime stability and may even make it easier for authoritarians to impose deeper restrictions on its people as they are now willing to tolerate them under the banner of them being necessary for economic recovery. The interesting middle case occurs when the downturn is harsh and the masses blame government, but elites support the regime. In Malaysia, opposition parties called for reformasi while blaming corruption and nepotism for the country’s economic woes. Public support for the movement was not lacking as can be seen in the results of the following election of 1999; however, despite the electoral shift, UMNO continued to prevail. This is because, in part, the business elites of Malaysia acclaimed Mahathir’s economic policies such as the ringgit peg (though perhaps this was more due to businesses receiving government bailouts than actual monetary policy achievement). Political elites dared not speak up due to the nature of Mahathir’s rule (and his well-demonstrated ability to eject members). The result is a political swing without regime change. Another issue unique to the region’s culture is the Asian perception of what good governance ought to be. At the foundation of western-liberal democracy is representation. Government officials are elected to represent a group of people, usually geographically defined, and advance their best interests in public. Implied by this “pillar” is the need for the citizens to choose who represents them best in a free and fair election. Departures in from this ideology take two separate routes in the cases of Singapore in Malaysia. In Singapore, the entire concept of electoral representation is replaced by the concept of electoral trust. In Malaysia, representation is based not on economic or social interest, but on racial and religious membership. In the procedural democracy of Singapore, representation through free and fair elections can be considered clouded at best. Instead, Singaporean “democracy” relies on trust. Elections are held such that the people can reaffirm their trust in the competency of the government. Under this ideology, a repressed and ineffective opposition is tolerable or even preferred as this is necessary for the trusted regime to function smoothly. In Malaysia, the very content of the ruling coalition (the Barisan National) is structured around racial politics. Even opposition parties are organized around race and religion (for example, PAS is a Malay Islamic party and the DAP is primarily Chinese). These representational lines are used and abused by political institutions in the name of racial harmony, such as the Seditions Act of 1972, so as to effectively quell opposition. In the cases of continued authoritarian rule, there are essential only these two departures from western-style representation. In fact, if not for the institutions put in place by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, representation would likely fall towards the Malaysian model. A 2005 interview by German reporter Der Spiegal quotes Lee on racial politics: In multiracial societies, you don't vote in accordance with your economic interests and social interests, you vote in accordance with race and religion. Supposing I'd run their system here, Malays would vote for Muslims, Indians would vote for Indians, Chinese would vote for Chinese. I would have a constant clash in my Parliament which cannot be resolved because the Chinese majority would always overrule them. So I found a formula that changes that... And that is exactly what happens in Malaysia. The vote is divided along racial lines and the dominant group, represented by UMNO, wins. Such are the ways in which procedural democracies stay authoritarian. How does this relate to economic growth and performance legitimacy? It effectively removes western-style democracy as an economically efficient form of government. In western democracy, people vote in their best economic interests. As such, on average, the most effective governments will maintain power for the longest periods of time; however, this would not happen in multi-racial Southeast Asia. Proof of this can be seen by comparing the economic stagnation of pre-guided democracy Indonesia under Sukarno as compared to the rapid growth under Suharto’s New Order regime. One could even go so far as to compare post-1998 growth in democratic Indonesia to authoritarian Singapore or Malaysia. Clearly, authoritarian governments lead faster developing economies, at least in the cases analysed here. Conclusions Legitimacy is key to regime continuity under every form of government and ideology. As such, any analysis as to how authoritarian regimes maintain power must centre on the creation and maintenance of legitimacy. Central to legitimacy is economic growth. In can be shown statistically that regimes that successfully create economic growth remain in power and that severe economic recession can topple a regime. Sustained growth, particularly growth that affects the standard of living for a large number of people, can create “performance equity” which can allow regimes to effectively weather recession and actually harness a downturn to strengthen their regime. Why is economic growth so central to regime stability in Southeast Asia? This can be explained through “Asian values” affecting how people evaluate a regime. Furthermore, racial segregation removes liberal democracy as an effective alternative to authoritarianism because it cannot be as economically efficient as a trusted authoritarian government. Does this mean Malaysia and Singapore will remain authoritarian forever or that Indonesia will eventually tend back towards authoritarianism? Not necessarily. Liberal democratization may yet occur in Southeast Asia, but only if advanced by a significant cultural shift. To use the terminology of the often cited Samuel Huntington, the 1st wave of cultural reinvention must occur before the 3rd wave of democratization ever reaches the region. Works Cited: Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. “The End of History and the Last Man” IMF World Economic Outlook April 1999. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/data/> November 11, 2009 Thompson, Mark. 2004. Pacific Asia after 'Asian Values': Authoritarianism, Democracy, and 'Good Governance' Case, William. 2004. New Uncertainties for an Old Pseudo-Democracy: The Case of Malaysia Beatty, Bob. 2003. Democracy, Asian values, and Hong Kong: evaluating political elite beliefs Lee Kuan Yew Interview. Posted August 2005 by Hsu, Steve. Interview by Spiegal, Dur. Translation by Sultan, Christopher. <http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2005/08/lee-kuan-yew-interview.html> November 14, 2009.
Danny Posted April 17, 2010 Report Posted April 17, 2010 My brain is screaming in pain..........................?
Annie Posted April 17, 2010 Report Posted April 17, 2010 My brain is screaming in pain..........................?
Kakakelvin Posted April 18, 2010 Author Report Posted April 18, 2010 Sighh.. Is there anybody on fro that can proof read this for me? Or at least read it and tell me what you think? Lol
Genesis Posted April 18, 2010 Report Posted April 18, 2010 I glanced over it (I have my own Poli-sci paper to proofread lol), it seems fine to me. Vividly depicting the marriage of capitalism and authoritarianism in Southeastern Asia. I also like how you mentioned that despite modernization and a raising middle class, there is stability. Puts the western philosophy of civil/political rights being a necessarily factor in order for there to be economic growth to the test.
Kakakelvin Posted April 19, 2010 Author Report Posted April 19, 2010 Lol 3000 words is quite short for an academic paper. I posted this incomplete. I added some analysis on the Gini index and on GNI per capita at PPP and some additional insights into institutional barriers to democracy so the final work is about 4200 words. Still considered medium-short. =]
Dearly Beloved Posted April 21, 2010 Report Posted April 21, 2010 (edited) O_______________O Wow. I just finished reading it and I'm amazed with the work. Overall, I think its pretty good. (: Your a smart fellow. :D Edited April 21, 2010 by Dearly Beloved
Kakakelvin Posted April 22, 2010 Author Report Posted April 22, 2010 This is pretty good and long.. Lmao thanks Som.
